Russia has constructed large fortifications in Ukraine. Will they stick?

Trenches are not new to Ukraine. Trench warfare has long been a feature of the campaign in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.The Ukrainians were fighting in the trenches on the side of the line near Popasna, where the Russians were waging a vigorous exercise Drive the Ukrainian army out of the city of Bakhmut.

But the speed and scale of Russia’s construction over the past few months is unparalleled. All of the structures pictured above emerged within six days.

The fortifications suggest that Russian forces are trying to create stronger, more defensive positions to withstand Ukrainian pressure, often with the help of natural obstacles such as rivers.

Last month, Ukraine recaptured swathes of territory in the south, including the regional capital Kherson, forcing Russian troops to cross the Dnieper River. The river is a natural barrier, and Russia has built a series of massive defensive barriers south of the river to keep Ukraine from crossing it.

Among these fortifications are rows of miles-long concrete pyramids known as dragon tooth and deep trenches called tank trap. Both are designed to slow down Ukrainian vehicles and force them into preset positions where Russian forces can target them.

Russia is also building miles trenches, and pill box – A small structure for their troops to shoot at.

These fortifications could slow down the Ukrainian army — but they’re only effective if properly staffed.

Philip Wasielewski, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, said that if the positions were unmanned, they would only be useful if Russia retreated in an orderly manner, one of the most difficult tactical operations to execute.

“There’s no guarantee that those soldiers will get to those fortifications. Or that once they get there, they won’t keep running,” Mr. Wasielewski said. “These are just holes in the ground unless they’re guarded by active, disciplined soldiers with artillery, mobile reserves and logistical support.”

The Times analyzed satellites to better understand Russia’s fortifications in eastern Ukraine radar data Regarding physical changes on the Earth’s surface. The data, along with high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet Labs, revealed rows of Russian fortifications lining the main highway behind the Russian front.

The Russian offensive continued near Bakhmut, pounding the city with artillery over the past two weeks and slowly gaining ground to the east and south of the city. The new buildings provided several defensive positions from which to retreat if the Ukrainians fought back.

That could help Russia avoid a repeat of its withdrawal from the Kharkiv region in September, when it lost thousands of square miles of territory and was forced to abandon military equipment.

Russia’s defense network near Popasna was built in just 11 days. Satellite data from Popasna showed a new row of defensive structures snaking north across open fields.

Some Russian military bloggers openly criticize Russia for building a solid front.in a telegram post On Dec. 6, former Russian intelligence officer Igor Strelkov said the decision to establish the long-term structure had been made “on a whim”.

“Following a strategy of protracted war is suicide for the Russian Federation,” he said.

Ben Barry, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that while trench warfare was associated with major 20th-century warfare, trenches and barriers can still play an important role in modern warfare because they can determine the range of an enemy’s attack.

“The whole idea of ​​a defensive position is to gain an advantage by being able to fight from a prepared position,” Mr Barry said.

During World War II, the Soviets used these types of fortifications to successfully hold off a German attack on the city of Kursk. Mr Barry said Moscow saw this as a model for Russian defensive warfare.

“They knew the Germans were there to attack. So they built defense in depth, with lots of obstacle strips, minefield strips, and defense strips, and they had strong reserves,” he said.

But trenches also had modern weaknesses. Many of them were built in the open air, within striking distance of Ukrainian artillery, making them especially vulnerable to drones.

The Ministry of Defense said in a statement that the construction of the fortifications near Ukrainian troops was likely to result in heavy Russian casualties near the town of Svatov in eastern Ukraine. statement.

One analyze A report published in late November by the U.S. research institute War Institute showed that Russia had established defensive positions deep south of Kherson before ordering a withdrawal in October from territory north of the Dnieper River.

Russian fortifications are farther from the front in Kherson than in eastern Ukraine. New buildings were discovered more than 50 miles from the Dnieper, which now serves as a natural barrier between the two sides.

Military experts say Russia may move to Kherson’s fortifications so it can redeploy troops to more active fronts in the war, such as Bakhmut.

Even so, it was a signal that “Russian military leadership views the prospect of a Ukrainian counteroffensive across the Dnieper as a serious threat,” according to an assessment by the Institute of War Studies.

Ukraine has made amphibious landing On a strategic peninsula at the mouth of the Dnieper River. The peninsula, known as the Kimborne Spit, could serve as a base for a Ukrainian attack deep into Kherson, so Russia has fortified a two-mile-wide strip that separates the spit from the mainland.

Many of the fortifications are designed to protect supply lines linking southern Kherson to Crimea, a peninsula that Russia illegally annexed in 2014. Even the loss of one of the two main highways “could put pressure on Russia’s logistical support operations east of Kherson and west of Zaporozhye,” according to the War Institute.

Defensive positions can be seen every five miles along the main M14 motorway from Kherson to Melitopol, the Zaporo region occupied by Russia early in the war A city in a hot area.

The success of these defensive structures ultimately depends on the quality of the troops defending them. Russia mobilized hundreds of thousands of recruits in September, but many arrived poorly trained and poorly equipped.

Analysts at the Institute of War Research wrote late last month that Russia may have deployed the recruits to front-line fortifications in Kherson, leaving more experienced units for secondary positions.

“Managing Russian front-line defenses with these inefficient, poorly organized, inadequately equipped and supplied personnel could cause them to collapse or retreat faster than Russia’s military leadership may have planned,” analyst wrote.